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I. Introduction
The recent availability of longitudinal data from low-income countries makes possible for the
first time the identification of the consequences of growth-augmenting innovations for household income
change. However, it has become increasingly recognized that both the analysis and design of panel
surveys is importantly affected by the break-up of households over time. For example, at the end of the
sample period of the Indian ICRISAT Village Studies Survey (Walker and Ryan, 1984), which followed
households in three villages for ten years, over 13% of the households had divided. Lifetime
retrospective information from the same survey indicated that 40% of the households had been formed
from extended households prior to the death of the head of the extended household. A newly-available
longitudinal national survey of rural Indian households (Vashishtha, 1986), described below, indicates
that over a twelve-year period, land and other assets were divided among male adult family members and
separate residence was established in 30% of the original sample farm households. Both surveys dropped
entire or sub-parts of households that had not remained intact as part of the survey design. Inferences
about economic mobility from these data would thus be biased to the extent that household splits are
nonrandom.
The neglect of the possibilities of  household break-up in the longitudinal study designs stems in
part from the relative absence of attention in the theoretical and empirical literatures to the determination
of household structure. Household structure is pervasively treated as an exogenous or fixed
characteristic. An improved understanding of the determinants of household division is thus useful not
only for dealing with the potential selectivity of panel designs that drop dividing households, but in
studying household behavior and income change generally. For example, in assessing the distributional
effects of income-augmenting development strategies, to the extent that, as is common in many low
income rural areas, co-production is tied to co-residence, household cum asset division can alter income
levels and growth if there are important scale economies of production. In that case, knowledge of the1The importance for measurement of well-being of the distribution of individuals with different
characteristics across households is clearly articulated by Basu and James Foster (1996) in their
axiomatic characterization of measures of literacy. 
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effects of an intervention on incomes for a given productive asset configuration is insufficient to predict
actual income growth in the absence of knowledge about how assets are divided via household break-ups.
Moreover, the recent panel survey of Indian households indicated that over a twelve-year period, 80% of
households either experienced no change or a decrease in landholdings. Of the 20% of those households
that had experienced a decrease in landholdings, in 79% of the cases this was due to household partition.
And, weighted by the size of the changes in landholdings, partition accounted for over 90% of the decline
in average household landholdings. Clearly household division, rather than market transactions, plays a
dominant role in the evolution of landholdings over time.
The effects of economic growth on income inequality has been a subject long investigated by
economists. Most studies have examined data describing changes in various measures of income
inequality or of income changes within income ranks as functions of measures of economic development
(e.g. Chenery, et al. 1974,  and more recently, Deininger and Squire, 1996). This methodology, however,
cannot provide information on how particular income groups benefit or lose from growth, since the data
used, repeated cross-sections, do not link individuals or households across time. Another approach uses
computable general equilibrium models to  examine through simulation methods the effects on economic
mobility - changes in the relative incomes of pre-defined income classes - from growth-inducing policies
(i.e., Adelman and Robinson 1978). In these models, however, the links between changes in the returns to
individual endowments yielded by the structural model parameters and changes in the incomes of
households are based on a set of fixed coefficients obtained from cross-sectional data that are used to
assign individuals of particular characteristics to particular household configurations.
1 To the extent that
growth has direct effects on the composition and numbers of households, as is likely, this method may
give misleading results.2Although collective models of household behavior with a household-specific a public good of
this form have been used in empirical applications to household formation through marriage (Foster
1996), this paper represents the first to our knowledge to focus on household division. Hayashi (1993)
tests for intergenerational altruism based on comparisons of two and single-generation households in
Japan and develops a model in which the demand for coresidence derives from the demand for a
household public good. As he notes, his estimates are potentially subject to selectivity bias because his
data do not provide information on both generations in split households.
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In this paper we formulate, test, and estimate a structural model of household division. Our
model is based on the recent primarily theoretical literature on the collective household (Chiappori 1988;
Browning and Chiappori 1996). This literature, and empirical studies that have attempted to test
“unitary” models of the household (Schultz 1990, Thomas 1990), have focused on the determinants of
the allocation of resources within intact households. An obvious failure of unitary household models,
however, is that they cannot account for the break-up of households. Our model of the collective
household assumes, as in the literature on the collective household, that individuals optimize subject to a
set of pre-defined entitlement rules (e.g., inheritance laws) and intrahousehold allocations are efficient.
Gains from co-residence arise from cost-sharing a household-specific public good and lower barriers to
information sharing on best-practice farming techniques, but whether such gains are sufficient to make
co-residence desirable depends on the existence of scale economies or dis-economies in production and
on how household structure affects risk diversification and risk-sharing. The model yields implications
for how household size and intra-household inequality interact with exogenous income growth to affect
(i) the amount of the household public good that is consumed, (ii) which households divide, (iii) the
exact divisions of the assets among the new households and (iv) the evolution of the incomes of the new
configurations of households.
2
The implications of the model are tested using panel data describing Indian farm households
starting from the onset of the Indian “green revolution” in the late 1960's through 1982. We find for
example that, as predicted by the model, within-household  inequality in schooling, marriages, and
riskiness increase the probability of household division. The estimated parameters of the structural model4
are used to evaluate the consequences of technical change for household income growth by economic
strata. The estimates indicate that inattention to the consequences of technical change for household
division can lead to a substantial overestimate of the extent to which better-off households differentially
benefit from technical change and demonstrate that the amount of within-household inequality can have
important effects on the evolution of land assets over time and for the interhousehold distributional
consequences of economic growth.
II. Theory
a. Household Public Goods and Household Surplus
A model of the decisions by individuals to consume and work together requires the specification
both of resource allocation across individuals co-residing in a joint household and the resources available
to the individuals if they reside in separate households. We assume that in each joint household j there
are N individuals (claimants or heirs) who have property rights with respect to a divisible asset that
produces a risky income stream. In particular, each claimant has the right to a share 6ij of the household
production asset Aj (e.g., land) in that the claimant may appropriate the proceeds from his share or sell it.
The property rights may be assigned by law (e.g., partible inheritance, primogeniture) or by norms (e.g.,
include only men among heirs). In the Indian context, inheritance customs determine the entitlement
shares of the claimants in a joint landowning household. Claimants are males. Among claimants whose
father is resident in the households, current claims are based on the shares of the land owned by their
father that they receive immediately after the death of their father. For brothers jointly farming land  (i.e.,
sons who have decided to continue to farm and reside together after the death of the father), the shares of
the total household land to which they have current entitlements are based on their inherited shares. 
Households are considered to be joint households if there is more than one claimant coresiding,
and are divided households if claimants separate from the joint household. Claimants who are adult sons
of the head and who leave the joint household take with them a portion of their father’s asset that is a
function of their future inheritance. However, joint households that remain intact experience changes in3Coresidence and joint production appear to be isomorphic among Indian households. Among the
reasons may be lower costs of information transmission and less scope for moral hazard among
coworkers who eat together. We do not model structurally these returns to coresidence and joint
production.
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household composition that can have important effects on the gains from jointness. Claimants in
household j may marry and have children and these changes may affect the value of joint residence. In
addition, grown sons and daughters who leave the household to set up their own households do not
necessarily break all economic relations with the original household. Evidence on interhousehold
transfers in India suggests that daughters, who have no inheritance claims and leave the household upon
marriage, participate in risk-sharing arrangements with their father’s household (Rosenzweig, 1988;
Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989) Symmetrically, claimants may marry and married women who enter a
household contribute to that household’s risk reduction. However, although transfers may take place
between departed sons and fathers, because the new household of the sons is typically proximate to that
of their father, such transfers do not significantly contribute to consumption smoothing. 
We assume that “autarchic” income, the income for an individual claimant farmed with his own
nuclear family (wife and own children), is the sum of labor income from his family Wi , the product of
the individual-specific productivity factor 2i and the stock of assets to which the individual has a claim,
an income shock ei , and net transfers Ji. Net transfers to household i depend on the number of departed
daughters Di , the income shock and the asset claim. Autarchic income is then  .
Analogously, joint household income is  .  The expected benefits from joint
residence/production depend on the expected value of the difference between yj
N and Eyi. and, given risk
aversion, on the difference in the riskiness associated with residence choice.
3  Gains from joint residence
thus may arise from scale economies in production but also arise from savings associated with the
financing of household public goods, jointly consumed by all claimants and their families. Offsetting
these consumption gains from joint residence that we incorporate in the model or in the empirical
implementation of the model are a) a direct preference for autarchic residence, b) possible diseconomies
to joint production, c) the possibility that the marginal utility for the public good is actually negative for4Note that ex ante efficiency coupled with A implies ex post efficiency–for each income
realization and residence status it is not possible to improve the utility of one claimant without decreasing




some claimants in the joint household, and d) reduced insurance associated with interhousehold transfers.
Whether households remain intact thus depends on the production technology, risk, the taste for privacy,
individual preference heterogeneity, and the household technology.
We assume that each household claimant’s nuclear family, described by a vector ni, consumes a
private good xij and a household public good zj .The vector ni contains the characteristics of the claimant
and his wife and children, including non-resident sons. Preferences also depend directly on household
structure, as indicated by rij. The individual utility of claimant i in household j is thus given by
and the budget constraint for the joint household is
Given (1) and (2), a potential source of conflict that may induce separation of household
claimants is differing preferences for the desired level of the public good, which must be consumed at
equal levels by all claimants when co-resident. In order to capture in relatively simple form the idea that
conflict over the provision of the household public good is central to the decision about joint residence,
that the degree of conflict is influenced by changes in income and by the amount of within-household
inequality, and that joint residence may be importantly influenced by risk considerations we impose three
restrictions on behavior in joint households: A. Decisions about joint residence in a given period must be
made before the income shocks are realized but consumption allocations in a given period are made
afterwards. B. Intra-household allocations conditional on residence and income realizations must be ex
ante efficient
4 in the sense that it is not possible for a household to improve the expected utility of one7
(3)
(4)
claimant (or sub-household) without reducing the expected utility of some other claimant. C. Each
claimant must be provided an ex ante expected utility level that is at least equal to that which he could
obtain if separately resident.
We assume that joint households will divide whenever it is not possible to satisfy condition C.
That is, a household breaks up whenever there are no gains from joint residence. The gains for household
j with N claimants may be defined as the difference between expected utility achieved by any heir i, say
the first born i=1, and his reservation expected utility subject to the condition that each of the N-1 other
claimants receives his respective expected reservation utility. That is, the gains from joint residence are:
such that
and  where expectations are taken with respect to states of the world, s and Ev(yi(s),
ri, ni ) is the expected utility of claimant i if he resided and worked outside the joint household with his
property 6ijAj. The household remains intact as long as the maximand in expression (3) is positive. Note
that the decision to divide the household depends only on whether the current surplus is negative.
Presumably forward-looking household members experiencing a negative surplus today might consider
the possibility that surplus might be positive in the future and not split if costs of household
reconstitution are high. However, as discussed below the processes that generate changes in household
surplus, such as technical advances and fertility, make reversals of surplus unlikely.
b. Parameterization of Preferences
The model as specified is silent on how the gains from joint residence are distributed. To obtain
specific implications for household division and a tractable estimation strategy it is necessary either to5It can be shown that at low levels of income the nonnegativity constraint for the pubic good
binds and all income is allocated to the private good. This appears reasonable given that at low levels of
income expenses will be dominated by food which would appear primarily to be a private good. It is also
worth noting that the parameter ( has a simple interpretation when this constraint binds: it is the




specify distribution rules or, alternatively, to choose a form for the utility function from which
implications can be derived that are independent of the intrahousehold distribution of coresidence gains.
We choose the latter strategy. In particular, we assume a parametric utility function for each claimant of
the form
where ri is assumed to be one for autarchic households and zero otherwise and thus * denotes the direct
preference for autarchic residence (privacy). This characterization of claimant preferences has the
property that the household demand for the public good does not depend on the household distribution of
coresidence gains, making it unnecessary to take a stand on which claimant is the maximizer. It
nonetheless captures the key elements of the decision about joint residence. This result follows from the
fact that (5) exhibits transferable utility. Bergstrom (1997) provides a useful discussion of transferable
utility in the context of models of household behavior. The transferable utility assumption also implies
that the distribution of assets within the household does not affect public goods consumption. Evidence
based on household data from Cote d-Ivoire (Duflo and Udry (2001))is consistent with this implication of
transferable utility.
Consider first the case of a claimant who lives apart so that the budget constraint is x+z=y,
suppressing the state s for notational convenience. Assuming an interior solution,
5 autarchic consumption
of the public and private goods, respectively, are9
(7)
(8)
and therefore autarchic utility is
Expressions (6) and (7) indicate that claimants with differing characteristics or incomes will exhibit
different demands for public and private goods in autarchy. If, for example, one element of n is the
number of children and the corresponding element in $ is positive, a claimant with more children will
wish to consume more of his income in the form of the private good, such as food for his children, and
less in the form of the public good. 
The model can also accommodate a special role for the household “head.” As heads gain
experience, for example, they may acquire greater preferences for household public goods as they
identify with the collective household. This is analogous to the household head caring more about the
private consumption of other co-resident family members. Thus an experienced head may have higher
demand for the public good compared with other household claimants, in which case one element of n
might be whether an individual is an experienced head. Under these circumstances, the death of a head
may then reduce the coresidence gains for the remaining younger family members who had benefitted
from the former head’s support of the public good. Indeed, we show below that under certain conditions
any factor that increases the demand for the household public good also increase the gains from
household jointness.
Carrying out the maximization given by equations (3) and (4) for the parameterization of utility
(5) and the expressions for autarchic utility (7) yields an analytic expression for the optimal level of the
public good in the joint household  10
(9)
While it is possible to derive a closed-form expression for coresidence gains and thus to derive
comparative static results for an arbitrary distributions of income shocks, the expression is simplified
with two assumptions. First, we assume that the production shocks take on two values, ±), that occur
with equal probability scaled by a  multiplicative parameter . that depends on local climatic conditions.
In the good (bad) state joint and autarchic incomes are given by  ( )
and  ( ), respectively, where   is the expected value of income and the J’s denote
transfers in the two states which are equal and of opposite sign and may depend on the magnitude of )
and whether one is married and/or has married daughters. Second, we define surplus in terms of a
monotonic transformation exp(.) of expected utility. The results for when a split takes place hold for any
monotonic transformation and, by choosing this transformation, the magnitude of the coresidence gains,
not just whether they are positive, is independent of the particular identity of the maximizer and of the
decision about how the gains from joint residence are distributed. Under these conditions the gains from
joining together all of the claimants in one household are
Equation (9) characterizing household surplus has implications for how household size, nuclear-
family characteristics and productivity affect household break-up. However, the expression also indicates
that intra-household claimant heterogeneity and income risk may play a role in the propensity of 
households to break up. To characterize more easily how the number of claimants, the characteristics of
their nuclear families, and productivity change affects the probability of the household dividing net of
heterogeneity and risk, we assume that all of the claimants are identical; i.e., ni=n, 6ij=1/N,  2i=2j
N=2 ,
*=0, and Wi=W and that )i=)
N=0 and Ji=J





with, for ">0, 
Thus for this homogenous household, household division will take place when
Differentiating (12) with respect to N yields the effect of  an increase in household size (number
of claimants) for the same total household asset on the propensity to split the household:
which is guaranteed to be negative when the demand for the private good is sufficiently high relative to
the wage (W-$ $ $ $’n<0) and public good consumption is at an interior solution (2A+NW-N$'n>(
(1+N")>0).The intuition underlying this result is that an increase in the number of household members
without an accompanying increase in household assets decreases per-capita income, which decreases the
gains from coresidence given the assumed structure. This is offset somewhat, but not completely under
the specified conditions, by the fact that an increase in the number of household members decreases the
average cost of the pubic good under joint residence.
Similarly, the sign of the effect of any element of n on surplus and thus the probability of
division depends, for the homogenous case, only on whether that element increases or decreases the level
of consumption of the household public good. In particular, the effect of the k
th element of n on6Note that it is only in the neighborhood of R*=0 that the sign(MR*/M2).sign(MR/M2); however,






and the effect on public good consumption is 
As these two expressions have the same sign, anything that increases public good consumption will also
tend to increase surplus and thus decrease the probability of household division. Thus, for example, if it
is found that the presence of young children in a joint household increases the demand for private relative
to public goods, then the birth of a child may increase the likelihood of household division.
The effect of an increase in productivity is similar also to the effect of increasing the number of
claimants. Differentiating R*(.) with respect to 2 gives
For a household that is at an interior solution in terms of the consumption of the public good (2A+NW-
N$ $ $ $'n>((1+N")>0),  so that income growth tends to increase surplus and thus discourages
division.
6  In this case the increased income results in an increase in consumption of the public good and
thus there is an increase in the amount that can be saved by joint consumption compared with
consumption under separate residence.
Less obvious implications of the model are that both heterogeneity within the household and13
(17)
(18)
income risk also affect the likelihood of the household breaking up. With respect to intrahousehold
heterogeneity, it is easily seen that, for given mean of yi-$ $ $ $’ni and    an increase in the
intrahousehold (inter-claimant) variance of yi-$ $ $ $’ni will tend to reduce R and thus joint residence, as (9)
can be rewritten
Intuitively, a higher intrahousehold variance of yi-$ $ $ $’ni implies greater differences among claimants in
their autarchic demands for the public good, whose consumption must be equal in the joint household. 
Intertemporal income variability also can affect household break-up in the model. There are two
mechanisms. First, the scale of operation may reduce income variance if yields are not perfectly
correlated across plots, that is if  . Second, household structure may affect the propensity of
family members to engage in risk-sharing arrangements. We assume that the number of marriages
associated with the joint household - the number of married daughters of household claimants and their
wives - affect interhousehold transfers, so that , where the Di represent the number
of married daughters and/or wives of each claimant, and the first partial is negative and all of the other
partials are positive. Similarly, for the autarchic household .
Differentiating with respect to climatic variability yields:
In the absence of transfers, as long as there is a positive taste for privacy (*>0) and imperfect covariances
across land plots, it is clear that surplus is increasing in climatic variability:7Lower insurance-based transfers under joint residence may arise, for example, from lower






However, to the extent that ex post risk-sharing, which relies on marital ties to specific individuals,
depends on whether those individuals are co-residing with other claimants, the existence of income risk
may change propensities to break up upon the marriage of a son or daughter. Differentiating with respect
to the number of married daughters, say, of claimant i yields
Without additional assumptions, expression (20) cannot be signed. The reason is that the effect on the
surplus from the joint household of an additional marriage associated with claimant i depends on the
relative magnitudes of transfers that the married daughter would make to the joint household and to
claimant i’s split-off household, J
N and Ji, and the differential responsiveness of transfers to shocks
across the two types of households. If, for example, daughters of the household head are more willing to
provide insurance-transfers to the head when he is alone then when he is coresiding with his adult sons
(and their wives),
7 then additional married daughters - or the marriage of a claimant - will reduce surplus.
This can be seen clearly in the case in which transfers are provided by i’s daughter’s (wife’s) family to
i’s household only if i’s residence is not shared. In that case expression (20) becomes15
(22)
(23)
which is negative as long as transfers do not fully offset production shocks and an additional married
daughter or daughter-in-law increases compensatory transfers. Expression (21) also shows that the
departure of a daughter for marriage or the marriage of a claimant in a joint household, when marriage-
based contributions to consumption-smoothing only occur in autarchic households, has a stronger
negative effect on joint household surplus the greater is the magnitude of the income shocks, as given by
the parameter .. Thus, “selfish” risk sharing creates an association between the marriage of claimants
and household division.
c. Incomes, Technology and Information
The model implies that changes in the level and riskiness of joint household income y
N , changes
in the level and dispersion of inter-claimant autarchic incomes, and marriage ties potentially affect the
patterns of household break-up over time. However, to obtain a model that is estimable, we need to be
more specific about the production technology governing autarchic and joint income production and how
these evolve over time. We assume that permanent changes in the productivity factors 2i and 2j
N arise
from two sources - changes in agricultural technology and farming expertise. In particular, we assume, as
suggested by evidence in Rosenzweig (1995) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1996), that schooling
augments the productivity of available new technologies through faster adoption and more efficient use
via more rapid learning by doing. Thus we parameterize autarchic productivity at time t for individual i in
area k as
where Si is i’s schooling, Nk is local agricultural technical change, and the 0’s are parameters.
Accounting for i’s claim on assets and his full labor income and introducing parameters that capture
static (0A ) and dynamic (0ANt) scale economies in farm profitability total autarchic income is 8Evidence in Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) suggests, for example, that whether anyone in the
household has a primary education is a more powerful predictor of the adoption of high-yielding seed
varieties in the early stages of the green revolution than whether the household head had completed
primary schooling. Joliffe (1997) and Yang (1996) also present evidence of the importance of the
maximum of the schooling of household members in determining household income. The relevance of
within-household information sharing for the distributional implications of educational inequality is




While the signs of the scale economies parameters are not obvious, we expect that the sign of 0SNt is
positive, given the productivity-augmenting role of schooling in an environment with technical change.
Thus, in technical progress areas, any within-household differences in schooling levels will result in
dispersion in autarchic incomes that will become more pronounced over time. This would reduce surplus,
for given total income in the joint household, due to a decreases in consensus on the level of the public
good to provide, and thus a greater likelihood of household splits in technical-change environments.
However, as noted, an overall increase in household income tends to discourage household division if it
increases the demand for the public good.
Finally, information among household members is likely to be readily shared within the
household and thus operates as a public good in production. In particular, when individuals live together
and jointly farm, the choice of best practice is likely to be determined collectively based on the co-
resident individual with the best information. If the most informed individual is the one with the most
schooling, the productivity of household j in area k at time t is
where Sj
max is the maximum schooling in the household.
8 Total joint household income is then
There are thus two potential sources of (expected) income gain arising from joint production - the
costless sharing of information, which should always increase surplus, and static and dynamic technical17
scale economies, which increase surplus only if positive. Given (17), (23) and (25) within-household
schooling inequality among claimants might therefore increase surplus in a high-growth setting and
reduce household break-up by producing a large difference between total household income yjt
N and the
sum of the individual incomes yit. The role of technical change in affecting household division is thus
unclear.
d. Head Mortality and Household Division
An important feature of the data describing household division, discussed below, is that most
splits appear to occur at the death of the household head, among households that have at least two heirs.
The model is capable of delivering the result that the death of a household head reduces household
surplus and thus is associated with household division, but it is necessary to specify a particular role for
the household head. As we have shown in (13), a reduction in the number of claimants if claimants are
homogeneous increases surplus because the increase in per-claimant income increases public good
consumption. Thus, if the head is like any other claimant, his death will not likely lead to division.
Moreover, if the head is different in a random way from other claimants, in preferences for example, his
death increases claimant homogeneity, which we have shown also increases household surplus.
Two cases in which the head’s death may lead to division are when the head has above average
preferences for the public good, as discussed above, and when the head has superior knowledge about
agricultural practices. As we show below, because of secular trends in schooling prior to the ARIS,
household heads tended to have higher schooling attainment than younger cohorts. If the head’s
schooling is the highest in the household and schooling provides superior skill, then  the head’s death
reduces the surplus from co-production. We will assess whether the level of the maximum schooling of a
household affects division and test directly whether a head’s characteristics matter for household public
good consumption
III. The Data Sets and the Sample  
The data used in this study are constructed from data files produced by the National Council of18
Applied Economic Research (NCAER) from their Additional Rural Incomes Survey (ARIS) and from
their follow-up panel survey, the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS). The 1971 ARIS
provides information on 4,527 households for crop year 1970-71 meant to be representative of 
households residing in all rural areas of India in that year excluding Andaman and Nicobar and
Lakshadwip Islands. The surveyed  households are located in 259 villages in 100 districts. In 1982,
NCAER canvassed all of the households in all of the original ARIS villages except those in the state of
Assam in order to create a sample frame for a follow-up panel survey of the 1971 sample. Every
household in the non-Assam villages in 1982 was traced back to the set of households existing in the
ARIS villages in 1971, including those in the 1971 sample. On the basis of these complete listings, a new
survey (REDS) was undertaken in 1982. The REDS resurvey included by design a subset of the 4363
non-Assam households in the 1971 round of the ARIS survey that met one of three pre-specified
household division criteria: (i) households for whom the household head remained in the village between
1971 and 1982, (ii) households in which the head had died but the rest of the immediate male relatives of
the head had remained together, and (iii) households in which the head remained alive but the household
had divided, defined as at least one adult male relative of the head permanently leaving the household.
REDS identifies which households in the original 1971 survey met each of the three criteria so that it is
possible to identify which of all of the ARIS original households in 1971 split by 1982 and which
experienced a death of the household head. For households in which the head was alive in 1982 but
which had split, however, information is only available on the individuals in the original household who
stayed with the original head. Moreover, if the head died between 1971 and 1982 and the household
divided, no information is available for any part of the household in 1982. These exclusions are what
make it necessary to estimate household division, and the identification of the sampling strata for the
1971 households from the 1982 canvassing makes this possible.
We examine the break-up of the 1971 households between 1971 and 1982 using information on
all farm households in the 1971 ARIS survey, regardless of their status in 1982, in which the head of the9There are 1,111 households in which there is more than one claimant in addition to the head, so
that if the head died household division would remain a possibility.
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household was aged 40 and over and in which there was complete information on all residing household
members in the 1971 ARIS survey. This sample numbers 1,784 households, of which 1,387 households
had one or more coresident claimants, e.g., a head and at least one son or brother, and thus the potential
for break-up.
9 Table 1 describes in detail the sample criteria for the ARIS households and their
classification based on the 1982 REDS.
We chose households with older heads for three principal reasons. First, older heads are more
likely to have adult heirs, and thus can divide. Second, older household heads are more likely to be
farming with their inherited landholdings, as their fathers are likely to have already died. Land
entitlements for the household members of these older-head households can thus be more accurately
specified, as we discuss below. Third, according to sources at NCAER, older household heads in 1971
who were still alive in 1982 were less likely to have moved out of the village or to have refused to
participate in the resurvey. This is important because ARIS households that were classified in the1982
survey as “refusers” and outmigrants are not identified and are thus are included in the category of 1971
households not reinterviewed along with those households that split and for which the head had died. If
these survey-eligible but excluded households are numerous, then the households categorized as divided
at the death of the head would include many households that did not actually divide. Fortunately, only
4.8% of the total 1971 sample eligible for the resurvey refused to be interviewed or moved out of the
village. Based on this overall figure, if none of the household refusers had divided by 1982 then at most
12% of the households classified as having a head death and a division by 1982 would not have actually
divided, and at most 8.5% of all 1971 households classified as dividing by 1982 would have been
misclassified. The misclassification figure for the sample of 40+ farm household heads is likely to be
significantly lower.
Because information is available from the 1971 ARIS data describing the characteristics of the
individuals in the households, it is possible to measure household inequality at the start of the 1971-8210Almost no coresident adult sons of the heads had children over 15 years of age, so that 
departures of their children were unlikely.
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interval. Moreover, the availability of fertility histories for all married women in the household enables
the characterization of the nuclear families of the claimants, the projection of changes in the size and
composition of the nuclear families over time due to fertility and mortality, and the inclusion in the
analysis of the roles of departed daughters and already-departed sons of the head in the initial year.
10  In
particular, we can take into account that some the households observed in 1971 had divided. prior to the
1971 survey, which is important for accurately computing asset claims. For each household in 1971, we
computed the number of the head’s sons who had already left the household as the difference between
the number of adult (10+) sons accounted for in the household roster and the number of the head’s
surviving sons born at least 10 years prior to the survey. This information is used in the structural model
to obtain a measure of the asset claims of the sons while their fathers are still alive and to measure the
initial intact (asset) conditions of all households, as described below. We also constructed a measure of
departed daughters using the same method as for the sons.  
Another important feature of the data is that the ARIS survey took place in the early stages of the
Indian “green revolution,” so that the experience of the households subsequent to 1971 was importantly
influenced by unanticipated agricultural technical change and economic growth. Productivity growth
occurred at very different rates across areas of India due in large part to differences in the suitability of
the soil and climate for the new high-yielding seeds of the green revolution. Estimates of district-specific
rates of technical change over the period 1971-82, obtained from profit function estimates based on these
data (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996), are available and can be used as an instrument to predict crop
productivity growth. In particular,  because the technical change estimates have error, we use them as
instruments for a Laspeyres-weighted index of district-level crop productivity growth. Thus, it is possible
to examine the impact of agricultural technical change on household division, on the evolution of
household configurations and on income net and gross of household division.
For the set of the ARIS households for which there is complete information in 1971 on21
household composition, there are also data on profits, gross cropped area, asset changes, financial
transfers, and indicators of village-level adverse weather in each of three crop years starting in 1968-69.
This three-year panel was used in Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) to estimate a profit function for the farm
households. We used the same data and estimation procedure to estimate a measure of per-area profit
variances based on per-hectare measures of profits, land assets (tubewells, fences, pumps), farm
equipment (ploughs, carts, blades) and area devoted to high-yielding seed varieties in the last two crop
years. Table A in the Appendix describes the procedure and the variables used and reports the fixed-
effects IV estimates of the per-hectare profit function. Based on these estimates we computed a farm-
specific, per-hectare variance measure of profit shocks as the square of the difference between the per-
hectare profit residuals (actual less predicted profits) across the two years. Because this measure of
riskiness contains measurement error, we regressed these farm-specific variance measures on a set of 16
state dummies and the average gross-cropped area of the farms, to control for the possibility that
operational scale may affect farm-level profit variances, as discussed. We use the coefficients on the state
dummies as measures of the profit risk faced by the households.
There are two caveats to this procedure. First, the estimates are obtained only for households that
did not split. Although the fixed-effects procedure yields consistent estimates of the profit parameters
even if, as our model implies, riskiness affects the probability of splits, if riskiness is associated with
unobserved fixed characteristics of farms then our estimated risk measure obtained from intact
households will be incorrect for divided households. We believe, however, that the largest component of
exogenous risk is spatial or is orthogonal to the detailed measured farm-specific  characteristics we have
in the data. Second, our measure of risk includes any time-varying unobservables of households. If we
have omitted important time-varying farm assets, for example, we will have obtained incorrect risk
measures.
The first two columns of Table 2 provide information on the sample of the 1,387 landowning
households in 1971 with a head aged 40 years and over that could divide after the initial survey,22
classified by whether or not the household had actually divided by 1982. The third column provides for
comparison descriptive statistics on landowning households in which the head is the only land claimant.
As can be seen from the table, more than a third of the households with at least one heir divided by 1982.
And, division does appear to account for most of the change in average per-household landholdings -
among the households that did not split there was an average decline of 1.5 acres (14.1%), while among
those households with the same head of household at each survey round but that divided, average
household landholdings dropped by 2.7 acres (21.8%). Because the households that divided began the
period with larger landholdings it appears that household division equalized per-household landholdings.
However, as we show below, the gross relationship between the initial size of household landholdings,
even on a per-claimant basis, and subsequent division is non-linear.
Another important characteristic of the sample households in1971, given the perspective of the
model, is the high proportion who have multiple claimants (the head and his sons or brothers) with
unequal levels of schooling (56%). Within-household (and cross-household) schooling inequality
evidently arises importantly from nonlinear and strong aggregate trends in schooling achievement in the
Indian economy combined with high fertility. These schooling trends also are responsible for the fact that
household heads, who tend to be the oldest claimant in most households, have higher levels of schooling
than other household members. Comparison of the households that split with those that did not indicates,
consistent with the model, that households that had more inequality initially were also more likely to
divide over the 12-year period - among the households that divided between 1971 and 1982 with multiple
heirs, almost 61% had unequal schooling at the start of the period. Among the group of non-dividing
households, the comparable figure was just over 38%. The division of households thus contributed to
lessening within-household inequality in schooling but to increasing differentials in between-household
average schooling levels.
IV. Household Structure, Marital Ties and Risk Reduction
The model suggested that claimants’ ties to other households that create the potential for risk-11The estimates are reported in Foster and Rosenzweig (2000).
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sharing arrangements can affect the household’s propensity to break-up, particularly in high-risk areas.
Table 2 also indicates that households that eventually divided and those that did not differed at the
beginning of the sample with respect to the state-level risk measure and the number of external household
ties associated with the claimants. In particular, households that eventually divided resided in slightly
riskier areas and had on average a greater number of daughters of the household head who had left the
household in the 1971, presumably for marriage, and a greater number of married claimants initially
residing within the household compared with households that remained intact over the period. We will
incorporate the effects of marital ties on household surplus through risk sharing in the structural model.
The three-year panel information on transfers and year-specific village-level indicators of
adverse weather in the ARIS data enables a more direct examination of the extent to which marital ties
affect the budget constraints of joint and autarchic households, in particular, the extent to which financial
flows between households tied by kinship and marriage serve to reduce consumption variability. The
panel data indicate that 13% of the farm households received a transfer over the three-year period. Based
on the information provided on whether the villages experienced  weather conditions that had an adverse
effect on crops in each of the three crop years, 61% of the households also experienced crop shortfalls in
at least one  year Although the data do not indicate the source of interhousehold transfers, it is possible
using the methodology in Rosenzweig (1988) and Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) and the household
structure and weather data to indirectly test whether household marital ties are related to consumption-
smoothing via interhousehold transfers.
Probit estimates of the determinants of the probability of a household receiving a financial
transfer in a given year based on the panel provide four results pertinent to the study of household
division.
11 First, the probability of receiving a transfer responds inversely to adverse weather, as would
be expected if such transfers were manifestations of interhousehold insurance arrangements. The
estimates indicate that while on average a household had a 2.5% probability of receiving a transfer in any12The reduction in interhousehold risk covariances associated with marital migration is the reason
given in Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) for marital exogamy in India.
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year, that probability increases by 31% in a bad-weather year. Second, although on average the incidence
of transfers does not depend on the number of departed married daughters or co-resident daughters-in-
law, the probability of a household receiving a transfer in a bad-weather year is significantly increased
the more married daughters-in-law that are residing in the household and the greater the number of
daughters who have departed the household to be married. The point estimates imply that adding a
departed daughter or a daughter-in-law symmetrically increases the probability of a transfer in a bad-
weather year by 44%. Third, having departed sons does not add significantly to the household’s
probability of receiving a transfer in adverse weather. This latter result does not necessarily reflect the
fact that sons are less tied to the origin household than are daughters, but likely reflects the fact that
departed sons remain in the village and thus experience the same adversity as the origin household at the
same time. Most of the married daughters reside outside the origin village and most of the daughters-in-
law come from households residing outside the village.
12 
Finally, the probit estimates suggest that household jointness reduces the willingness of the
households connected via marriage to participate as fully in risk-sharing arrangements with joint
households as with separate households. The estimated effect of an additional departed daughter on the
transfer probability in adverse weather was substantially less for joint households than for households in
which the head was by himself, although the difference is not measured precisely. This evidence
suggests, according to the model, that the positive effects of income variance on joint residence will be
lower in households with more marital ties relative to those with fewer marital ties.
V. Determinants of Household Division: Probit Estimates
We first use the data on the 1971 farm households that have the potential to divide to directly
estimate the determinants of the probability of household division making use of the insights of the
model. Table3 reports probit estimates of the determinants of the probability that a 1971 household with
multiple claimants split by 1982 based on the 1982 sample classifications. In the first column, estimates25
are presented from a specification which ignores the potential effects of household inequality, income
growth, income riskiness and departed kin on household surplus, including only the number, marital
status and average schooling and age of the claimants along with owned household landholdings, the
number of children by sex. These estimates are conventional and unsurprising, suggesting that household
size (the number of claimants and the number of claimant wives) and the age of the head (which strongly
predicts head mortality) have significant effects on division - more crowded households with older heads
in 1971 are more likely to have divided by 1982. Size of landholdings, however, appears to have no
direct effect on the probability of household division, net of the effects of the other variables.
The second specification adds measures of household inequality that the model suggests are
important determinants of household division. In particular, the specification adds the within-household
distribution of schooling as measured by the intra-claimant variance and the maximum of schooling in
the household. As expected based on equations (17), (23) and (25), increases in the intrahousehold
variance of schooling (and thus autarchic income), given maximum schooling (and thus joint household
income), increase household division, but increases in the maximum of schooling for given mean and
variance result in decreases in household division. An additional interesting result, also seen in the first
specification, is that division is more likely the higher the number of young male children in the
household, but not female children. There are two possible interpretations of this. First, if male children
are allocated more (private) resources than are female children, consistent with the sex-bias observed in
India (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1983; Sen, 1990), then the presence of male children reduces public
good consumption and thus household surplus. However, having more boys also predicts additional
claimants in the future, and additional claimants reduce household surplus. Additional (future) adult
daughters, who depart, also affect coresidence surplus, but that effect depends on the differential strength
of ties to parents and by parental co-residence.
The model also suggests that technical change affects household division to the extent that it
influences heterogeneity in inter-claimant preferences for the public good, the difference between joint26
household income and the sum of autarchic incomes, and the overall income level. Although because of
these multiple pathways by which technical change may influence the surplus associated with co-
residence it is not possible to sign the overall effects of technical change and schooling on household
break-up, there are implications for interactions between technical change and other household
characteristics: technical change should reduce household division in a homogenous household (equation
(16)) and should increase division probabilities differentially in households with high maximum
schooling for given mean and variance of schooling (equations (17), (23) and (25)).
The third specification includes district-level crop productivity growth over the period 1971
through 1982, instrumented with the district-level technical change estimates of Foster and Rosenzweig,
along with the state-specific measure of income variance per hectare. These results imply that,
conditional on the income riskiness measure, on average higher income growth has a marginally
significant negative effect on the probability of splitting. In the fourth specification, the instrumented
productivity growth measure is interacted with the mean, variance and maximum of schooling for the
household. The estimates of the interaction coefficients provide additional support for the model. First, at
zero variance for schooling among claimants and at the population mean and maximum of household
schooling, the coefficients imply that a 10% increase in yield per acre above the mean of 817 results in a
7.1% decrease in splits in multi-claimant households. Second, the coefficient on the yield growth ×
maximum schooling interaction is negative and significant at the 10% level - division is less likely in a
high-growth environment the higher is the schooling of the claimant with the most schooling.
The coefficient on the income risk measure implies that surplus in joint households is on average
higher in environments in which income risk is greater. The effect is small - a one-standard deviation
increase in the variance of profits per hectare decreases the probability of household division by 6.8%.
This implies that there are relatively small gains from land consolidation associated with imperfect
correlations in local profit shocks. However, the model suggests, along with the results from the
investigation of the determinants of transfers, that the effect of riskiness on joint household surplus is27
reduced the greater the number of marital ties in the household and, conversely, that adding marital ties
reduce the surplus from coresidence in risky environments. In the final specification, we add the number
of departed household members - sons and daughters of the head - and interactions between the income-
risk measure and the two variables representing marital ties - the number of daughters-in-law and the
number of departed daughters - that the transfer results suggest play important roles in determining risk-
reducing interhousehold transfers. The addition of these variables does not substantially affect the
estimates of the other coefficients in the specification. However, the added variables have significant
effects on the probabilities of household division. The signs of the interaction terms, moreover, are
consistent with the implications of the model and the transfer estimates. The point estimates suggest that
a departed son increases the probability by 14% of the remaining household dividing. At the mean level
of risk, adding one daughter-in-law to the household increases the probability of division by 66% and the
marriage of a daughter of the head, at the mean, has little effect on the split probability. Where profit
riskiness is one standard deviation above the mean, however, adding a daughter-in-law doubles the
probability of splitting, and the marriage of a daughter increase the division probability by almost 10%. 
VI. Estimation of the Structural Model
While the estimates in Table 3 permit an assessment of the validity of the proposed model and
show the effects of changing household size, adding marital ties, the distribution of schooling, and rates
of technical change on household division probabilities, they cannot be used to draw inferences about the
composition of split households – who splits from whom. Consequently, given the non-linearities
associated with technological returns to scale and within-household human capital spillovers associated
with information sharing, the probit and regression estimates can provide only limited insight into the
implications of technical change for growth rates in household incomes and the differentials in growth by
economic strata. Moreover, the finding that diversity and household break-up are correlated is consistent
with alternative mechanisms than disagreement about the household public good, such as increased
coordination or information costs. To examine these issues we adopt a more structural approach.28
A key advantage of the structural approach is that with structural estimates from the model we
can assess how technical change affects incomes inclusive of its effect on household division. We can
compare these results to what would have been predicted ignoring household break-up, that is, as if all
households stayed intact. We estimate the parametric structural model described in equations (9) and (25)
based on the explicit asset claims of household members by fitting predictions of the model, for given
parameter values, to the ARIS-REDS data on initial and final-period incomes and land holdings, and
information on household division using a simulated method of moments procedure as discussed below.
The estimated model parameters can then be used to assess the importance of endogenous household
division in affecting the growth of household incomes induced by improvements in agricultural
productivity.
a. Asset Claims and Family Assets
Estimation of the structure of the model, which involves the computation of household surplus at
any given moment of time, so that we can estimate the division of landholdings depends importantly on
the claim of each household member on household assets. Given that we do not explicitly observe the
division of assets at the time of division, and could not in any case observe the claims on assets for
household members that do not leave, it is necessary to explicitly specify asset claims in the model. The
institutional rules governing claims on family assets in India are reasonably clear and can be used, in
conjunction with the individual relationship information in the data, to impute asset claims for each
household member. For each household in the 1971 sample, the set of individual asset (land) claimants
was defined as the household head and any son or brother of the head of the household aged 10 years or
older. Based on the practice of patrilocal partible inheritance that predominates in South Asia, we
determined, based on the number and relationship of each of the claimants to the household head, the
share of household land that each claimant was entitled to if he should separate from the household. In
particular, under these rules upon the death of their father brothers are entitled to equal shares of the
land.29
The land for which the head has formal ownership rights does not correspond to the observed
landholdings Aj of the head’s household in cases in which any of the sons of the household head have
already left the household and “taken” some of the land with them. We assume that sons splitting from
the household before the death of the father have a claim to some but not all of their eventual inheritance.
In particular we assume that sons are entitled to a fraction 8 of the share of the father’s total inherited
land Aj* to which, by the inheritance rules, they would be entitled upon the death of their father. Thus in
a household with b co-resident brothers of the head (assuming brothers who have left the household have
“taken” their land with them) and s sons of the head gs of whom have left the household with their asset
shares, the amount of land over which the head has formal ownership rights, that is, pre-division assets
Aj*, is given by the formula Aj* = (Aj/(1 - ((gs)8/(1+b)s))). This implies that the entitlement 6j for a son
in a household in which some of his brothers have already departed is 1/((1+b)s/8 - gs). Upon the death
of the head, we assume that the departed sons take the remaining fraction of their inheritance from the
household.
Because information on the number of sons that have previously left a household is critical for
computing land entitlements among the remaining claimants in the household, such information is also
necessary for predicting future household divisions. Indeed, the relationship between entitlements,
observed household landholdings, and departed sons may account in part for why in the probit regression
the number of departed sons, for given observed household landholdings, was correlated with the
probability of a household’s subsequent division. Information on the number of already-departed sons
and knowledge of 8, the pre-inheritance entitlements of sons, are also necessary to backcast or
reconstruct the pre-division landholdings of already divided households based on observed household
landholdings in the current period. Such information thus can be used to more accurately predict
household division prior to the sample survey. However, 8 is not observable and can only be estimated as
part of the structural model.
b. Fertility, Marriage, Preferences for Private Goods and Income Variance13Of course, from that fraction of the 1971 household that is reinterviewed in 1982 it is in
principle possible to construct actual fertility and marriage histories. But no information is available for
those individuals who split off and the fertility and marriage patterns in 1982 among intact households
are obviously selective with respect to household division over the 1971-1982 period.
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Because changes in family size among claimants and the addition of marital connections can
affect household surplus, to assess changes in surplus over time it is also necessary to project both
fertility and marriages for each household claimant in the 1971 survey.
13 We do this by using the fertility
and marriage histories and information on coresident daughters available in the demographic component
of the 1982 survey to estimate fertility, nuptiality, and residence  prediction equations that condition on
claimant age and schooling, as discussed in Appendix A. Starting in 1971, births by sex and changes in
marital status in 1972 were then drawn at random from the distributions implied by these estimated
equations given the claimant’s characteristics in 1971 (age, marital status, schooling, and composition of
children by sex). Marital status and family size by sex were then updated and used as a basis for
simulating demographic changes in 1973 given the simulated characteristics in 1972 and so on.
Simulated marriages of daughters in that year were used to increment the stock of absent daughters for
each claimant. Similarly, simulated household divisions, as discussed below, were used to increment the
stock of absent sons. This process was repeated through 1982 yielding the required birth, marriage,
absent children, and residence trajectories that were used to construct the indices $ $ $ $’n determining the
claimants’ demand for private consumption in each year. The number of absent daughters, along with
landholdings, an indicator for joint residence, and the marital status of the claimant, are used to compute
the effective income variances, that is the income variances net of insurance-based transfers, for
autarchic and joint households. In particular, the effective income variance for autarchic and joint
households are:
and 
,14This algorithm does not allow for the possibility of splits by coalitions. We also attempted to
estimate a model with the same structure but in which all possible combinations of household members
were computed in each period. Although a variety of different initial values were tried for the parameters,
this procedure failed to converge.
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respectively, where Di denotes the number of absent daughters of claimant i and mstat takes on the value
of one if claimant i is married.
c. Estimation Method
For a given set of parameter values, the data on asset claims, schooling, technical change, 
demographic characteristics and expected incomes for each claimant and for the household as a whole
are used to compute the degree of surplus R for any potential subset of coresident claimants based on (9)
in each year. Computation of division configurations based on the surplus calculations proceeded as
follows: The viability of a given household represented in the 1971 survey in 1972 was determined by
examining whether the collection of 1971 claimants, given the predicted 1972 values of their individual
and joint incomes and their individual demographic variables, generated positive surplus. If so, the
household was assumed to remain intact in 1972. If not, the surplus was computed for the subhousehold
that would remain if the i
th claimant were to depart from the household and take his share of the land
86ijAj.
14 This computation was made for each of the N-1 claimants other than the head for each set of
parameter values. The 1972 joint household was then determined to be that subhousehold that provided
the greatest surplus. This procedure is equivalent to choosing the split-off  that maximizes the sum of the
utilities of all claimants. Given that the functional form for individual utility (4) is consistent with
transferable utility any division that yielded a lower sum of utilities would not be efficient. 
Similarly, the determination of whether a household division would occur in 1973 was made by
examining whether the resulting household from 1972 would generate positive surplus in 1973, and so
forth for every year until 1982. In cases in which the death of a head was recorded over the 1971-1982
interval, it was assumed that the death took place in 1977, at which time headship was reassigned to the
next oldest claimant, land that formed the remaining portion of the inheritance (1-8) for sons that had
previously left the household was allocated to them and the pre-inheritance parameter 8 was set to one32
for the land shares of the head’s sons. The household surplus algorithm was then applied to the new
household, with the surviving joint household dividing only if it was determined that the computed
surplus among the surviving claimants, given their new entitlements, was negative. The resulting
predicted household structure in 1982 was used to compute 1982 household income as well as the land
that would be held by the household given the divisions that are predicted to have taken place.
Parameter values were obtained using the method of simulated moments, with four moment
conditions matching (i) predicted incomes in 1971 and (ii) an indicator of whether a split was predicted
over the 1971-82 period to the actual data for all 1,387 households and (iii) predicted landholdings and
(iv) incomes in 1982 to the values provided for the 1,022 intact and divided panel households in the 1982
survey. We chose a simulation-based method because of the need to use simulated rather than actual
trajectories of births and marriages to determine surplus and thus split probabilities. The method of
simulated moments was selected rather than simulated maximum likelihood because the former yields
consistency without the requirement that the number of simulations grow with the sample size (Pakes and
Pollard,1989). Details of the numerical procedure are given in the Appendix B.
VI. Structural Parameter Estimates
The top panel of Table 4 presents the estimates of the structural preference parameters of the
model; the bottom two panels report the estimates of the income-generating 0 parameters from (25) that
were jointly estimated with the structural parameters and the variance-effects parameters >, respectively.
All of the parameters, except for that relating landholdings to income variance, are estimated with a
reasonable degree of precision. The " parameter is positive, indicating a diminishing demand for the
public good as incomes increase, as was assumed in the theoretical derivations of the effects of technical
change and the number of claimants on division probabilities. The estimate of 8 indicates that the head
retains an important share of the heritable asset prior to his death - the share of the heritable asset that can
be split off prior to the death of the head is evidently around 40 percent of that to which the claimant is
entitled after the death of the head (father). * and ( are also positive, indicating, respectively, that there15Note that by allowing head status to only affect tastes for the person who is household head at
the beginning of the survey period we are assuming  in effect that only an experienced head has different
tastes for the public good and that the original head has served as head for some time. The absence of
detailed data on the duration of headship precludes direct examination of this assumption.
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is a positive demand for privacy and positive marginal utility of income for all positive levels of
consumption. 
The negative and statistically significant $ coefficient for the household head indicates that the
head has a special role in holding the household together.
15 In particular, household heads tend to value
the private good less than do other household members. This suggests, net of the other reasons that the
death of the head may affect household division embodied in the model, including those related to
changes in the distribution of schooling, the number of claimants, and the claims on assets for sons of the
head, why there is a  high probability of division among households experiencing a death of the head.
The positive $ coefficients for the number of young daughters and sons indicate that the birth of a child
increases the demand for private goods in the household, with private-good demand being higher by
almost 21% for boy children than for children who are female. Note that this differential in the estimates
of sex-specific intrahousehold child resource allocations, based solely on data describing household
division and the total incomes of the households, is consistent with the observed higher rate of mortality
for girls than for boys observed in India (Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983), Sen (1990)) which have been
used to infer inequality in the intrahousehold allocation of resources to boys and girls. The marriage of a
claimant, net of the effect of the birth of a child, decreases the demand for the private good.
The scale effects parameters associated with the production technology indicate modest static
scale diseconomies - income gains evidently arise, for given schooling distributions, from farming with
smaller landholdings. The point estimates indicate that for each acre increase in land, income is reduced
by 3.8%.
16 It is possible that the evidence on scale diseconomies is biased due the existence of a negative
correlation between average household land quality and size of landholdings, as found by Benjamin
(1995) for Indonesia (using household structure as one identifying instrument). To assess the potential17This is consistent with findings in Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) that larger farms optimally
plant a greater amount of new-technology seeds in every period and thus, through learning-by-doing
effects, experience more rapid productivity gains.
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importance of this we estimated using household fixed effects the relationship between farm profits per
acre and size of landholdings, district-level productivity, and productivity interacted with landholdings
based on our panel data. If land quality varies importantly across households - the source of land quality
bias in the cross-sectional estimates of Benjamin - but land quality does not significantly vary across land
plots within households then these within-household estimates are uncontaminated by the absence of a
measure of land quality. The fixed-effects estimates (N=1231), which control for household-level land
quality, also indicate the presence of both static and dynamic scale economies: profits per acre = -
54.5*land - 68.0*land*productivity + 879.2*land productivity, with absolute values of t ratios of 1.43,
2.69 and 2.93 respectively.
The estimates thus indicate that there are two costs associated with coresidence/coproduction -
reduced utility from joint residence and lower land productivity. On the other hand, there are dynamic
scale economies - technical change enhances productivity per acre more for households with larger
landholdings (0NAt>0), with the point estimate suggesting that after 11 years a one acre difference in
landholdings is associated with an extra 2.8% increase in output per acre in low as compared with high
technological change areas.
17 These effects together suggest that how households divide matters for the
level of and changes in income per claimant and that technical change, net of income effects, increases
the surplus from jointness. The estimates of the determinants of land productivity also indicate, however,
that the effect of technical change on income growth is also greater the higher is the maximum level of
schooling in the household (0NSt>0), with the point estimate indicating that a one-year increase in the
maximum schooling of a household would after 11 years increase output per acre by 143 rupees more in
high as compared with low-technical change areas. This result implies that inequality in schooling among
claimants will be more strongly associated with the variance of autarchic income in high technical
change areas than in those areas with stagnant technology.35
Finally, the estimated risk-based income variance parameters, again obtained based only on
information on household splits and income change, suggest, consistent with the empirical findings on
interhousehold transfers, that the marriage of a claimant who resides in a non-joint household reduces the
net variability in household income (by 20% (>2=-.2)) and that the contribution of the claimant’s marital
ties to variance reduction is 40% less if he resides in a joint household (>4=.59).  The absence of formal
insurance markets thus enhances the prospects of household division upon the marriage of a claimant.
However, one coefficient appears at odds with those obtained from the probit analysis of division and
transfers, as the number of departed daughters (Di) appears to be associated with increased net household
income variability.
VII. Structural Model Validation
The structural model parameter estimates appear to predict reasonably well the patterns of
household splits in the sample. To assess the relationship between initial inequality in household
resources at the individual level and subsequent household division and income growth, we stratified the
sample households, using 1971 sample weights, into four strata according to the amount of landholdings
per claimant. The model mimics the observed inverted-u-shaped pattern of split probabilities across the
four per-claimant landholding groups. The model tends, however, to underpredict household division in
the bottom part of the distribution relative to that in the top quartile, possibly because households with
smaller landholdings are the most likely to migrate and thus to be misclassified in the data as a divided
household with a deceased head. Households with lower per-claimant landholdings also have small total
holdings of land.
Although the estimated parameters appear to predict well actual income change for those
households included in the panel - the correlation between predicted and actual income change is over
0.4 - the structural model estimates account for only a small part of the relationship between the odds of a
household split and the 1971 household characteristics. We added to the probit specification in column
five of Table 3 the predicted probability of a split for each household over the 1971-82 period obtained18We did not use the information on fuel expenditures to estimate the parameters of the model
precisely because fuel expenditures contain both private and public-good elements. However, we would
expect that the measure is highly correlated with true public goods consumption.
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from the structural estimates. The coefficient was .369, with an asymptotic standard error of .102 and the
variable increased the pseudo R
2 of the equation by by 12%. Thus the non-linear transformation of the
regressors that should predict splits if the model is correctly specified contributes significantly to
explanatory power even after controlling for the linear effects of these regressors.  The coefficient and its
statistical significance was similar when the other regressors were excluded, but the pseudo R
2 of the
predicted variable alone was only .006, and the addition of the regressors increased the pseudo R
2 by a
factor of ten. Clearly, the simplifications incorporated in the structural model, in particular the
specifications used to predict the fertility and marriage trajectories, omit important factors leading to
household division that are picked up by the regressors.
The availability of data in the 1982 survey describing household consumption expenditures
provides a second basis for assessing the ability of the structural model to track household behavior as
well as to assess the linkage between household jointness and public good demand that is the core of the
theoretical model. Consumption expenditures are disaggregated into 12 categories, among which is
expenditures on fuel and electricity. Such expenditures contain an important public goods component
that is likely to make up a large share of the overall public good in a household. In implementing the
estimation of the structural model, predicted public good consumption for each sample household at each
point in time is computed based on the estimated parameters. If the model is appropriate and household
fuel and electricity expenditure represents an important household-specific public good then, even though
expenditure data were not actually used in the process of estimation, one would expect the predicted
public good expenditure shares from the model to predict actual fuel expenditures.
18 We regressed actual
household fuel expenditure in 1982 on the predicted public good expenditure for 1982 from the model
and the household’s actual 1982 total consumption level, with the latter included in order to allow for the
possibility that fuel expenditures are only a component of public good expenditures and that within the37
(26)
class of all public goods fuel expenditure may be more or less income elastic. Figure 1 presents the
leveraged residual plot based on the estimated regression equation (for the 1,387 households):
with t-ratios in parentheses. The structural parameter estimates, obtained using only information on
household division and income, appear to successfully predict household public goods consumption. It
appears that household public good consumption and household division are thus importantly related as
implied by the model. Predicted household public good consumption predicts household division. The
coefficient on the predicted household public good in a probit regression of household division on the
predicted household public good and household consumption is -.188, with a standard error of .0535. 
VIII. Assessing the Effects of Technological Change
In this section we use the structural parameter estimates and the predicted growth variable to
assess how economic growth effects income mobility, taking into account the endogenous division of
households that in turn affects income. In particular, we want to assess how households classified by per-
claimant landholding fare relative to each other when there are advances in agricultural productivity. In
order to do this, we keep track of the changing household affiliations of the initial claimants, as predicted
by the structural estimates. As noted, it is not obvious a priori how technical change, for given within-
household schooling inequality, affects the propensity for households to divide - although higher
technical change results in greater propensities of household division due to the higher variance in
autarchic incomes, the gains from co-residence and co-production are increased both by the increase in
incomes and the higher return to joint production arising from the sharing of productivity benefits
accruing to the highest-schooled claimant (S
max) under rapid technical change. Nor is it obvious based on
the parameter estimates, for analogous reasons, how an increase in the within-household variance of
schooling will affect household division or how this effect is influenced by technical change, at least to
the extent that an increase in schooling variance, for given mean schooling, is associated with an increase19It is possible, at least in principle, to experience an increase in the intrahousehold variance in
schooling with the maximum schooling in the household fixed. Such an increase in variance would
unambiguously increase splits, with larger effects in areas with rapid technical change. This prediction is
substantiated by the probit estimates from Table 3, which control for maximum schooling.
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in household maximum schooling.
19 An assessment of the effects of technical change and of changes in
within-household schooling inequality on household division and income change thus requires
simulations.
In order to examine the role of household division in the relationship between technical change
and income growth, we used the structural estimates to predict the rate of income change for low and
high levels of technical change under two scenarios. In the first we allow households to divide, as
predicted by the model, and sum incomes over the predicted component parts of the original household.
We refer to the income summed over all of the subcomponents of the original households as “dynastic”
income. In the second scenario we predict household income conventionally; that is, based solely on the 
existing asset distributions and determinants of income change; i.e., under the assumption that
households remain intact (but age and reproduce). The simulations were carried out using the 1971 ARIS
sample of cultivating households that were at risk of dividing over the 1971-1982 period. In particular,
the model parameter estimates were used to generate, for each household, predicted 1971 income levels
(inclusive of full-time labor income), predicted 1982 incomes for the same household if it remained intact
or of each split-off household from the original household if it divided as determined by the structural
model, and predicted 1982 income under the counterfactual assumption that the 1971 household
remained fully intact. 
Figure 2 plots the difference in average predicted dynastic and intact-household income growth
by the 1971 per-claimant land quartiles, corresponding to zero technical change (low) and average
technical change (high). Both sets of predictions indicate that claimants residing in households with more
land per claimant benefitted more from accelerated agricultural productivity growth. However,
comparison of the two sets of columns indicate that both the amount of and inequality in income growth
is overstated if household division is not taken into account. In particular, dynastic income increases39
14.5% more than intact-household income in the lowest quartile group but by 14% and 27% less in the
two highest groups. Accounting for household division is evidently important in assessing the
distributional impact of technical change, and household division evidently dampens the adverse
distributional consequences of augmenting agricultural productivity.. 
An important factor accounting for the difference between the counterfactual or naive simulation
and that incorporating household division is the substantially stronger negative effect of increased
agricultural technical change on division probabilities for the farm households in the top quartiles of the
per-claimant land distribution. The first row in Table 5 displays the change in the rates of division for the
four per-claimant landholding groups due to accelerated technical change. Moving from a low to a high
technical change environment evidently slightly increases division propensities for the bottom two
quartiles but decreases substantially household division in the top two quartiles. The relatively higher
rates of land division in the lower quartiles than in the upper quartiles would raise incomes in the bottom
groups relative to the top groups due to the operation of scale diseconomies.
Why did agricultural productivity growth reduce division in the upper quartiles? One reason is
that increases in agricultural productivity growth raise incomes and therefore the demand for the
household public good more in the land-rich households. The last row of Table 6 displays the effects of
growth on the demand for the household public good in the original 1971 households by quartile, which
shows a monotonic positive, but decreasing effect as per-claimant landholdings rise. Another
contributing factor is that average 1971 within-household inequality in claimant schooling was larger in
the households in the top two quartiles. Although high rates of technical change exacerbate autarchic
income differentials for given schooling heterogeneity, and thus enhance disagreement in preferences for
the household public good, this effect was evidently outweighed by the gains from human capital
externalities associated with returns to information sharing that are enhanced when rates of technical
change are high. To quantify the role of intrahousehold inequality in mediating the effects of technical
change-induced income growth on household division, we carried out a simulation in which we40
eliminated all of the intrahousehold variance in schooling while maintaining the same average schooling
level in each household. The second row in Table 6 provide the resulting growth effects on division in
this scenario and can be compared to those predicted on the basis of the actual amounts of within-
household schooling inequality in the first row. As can be seen, the mean-preserving decreases in the
intrahousehold schooling variances reduce dramatically the negative effects of technical change in the
top two quartiles, by 35% and 61% respectively. This is consistent with the fact that upper-income
households evidently would lose the benefits from co-producing with a highly skilled claimant by
dividing household assets among claimants with lower levels of schooling under a high technical-change
regime. Within-household schooling inequality evidently plays an important role in the division of
households and in income mobility associated with technical change. 
IX.  Conclusion
Despite long-standing concerns about the extent to which the benefits of income growth resulting
from technological progress accrue primarily to better-off households, little evidence has, to date, been
brought to bear on this issue. Empirical evidence on this subject consists largely of studies examining
changes in the distribution of income across households over time using repeated cross-sectional data and
the relationship between these changes and income growth. These studies are incomplete in two
important ways. First, they do not distinguish between income growth that may in part be influenced by
the income distribution and the effects of exogenous technological progress on the distribution of
income. Second, because the data sources used do not permit the tracking of individual households over
time, these studies can only indirectly address the central question: to what extent is the effect of
technical change on household income growth higher among those with greater wealth?
In this paper we use newly-available panel data to examine the consequences of economic
growth propelled by agricultural technical change on economic mobility. Long-term panel data of the
type that we study reveals that an important impediment to the study of income mobility and the
evolution of the distribution of income over time is the changing composition of households. In the41
context of rural India this is principally due to household division, which also is evidently a more
important determinant of household wealth changes than is household-specific accumulation. Thus, to
understand the consequences of economic growth for changes in the income distribution and for
economic mobility as well as to fill in missing data arising from the incomplete follow-up of split-off
households typical of a long-term in panel survey we develop and estimate a model of household
division. 
The model, consistent with conclusions drawn from the recent literature on the microeconomics
of collective household behavior, of necessity treats the household as a collection of individuals rather
than a single economic unit. In particular, we show that a model in which the decision about joint
residence is driven by the presence of household-specific public goods captures key features of
household break-up and yields sufficient structure to allow the identification of underlying preference
parameters even in the absence of direct observations on resource allocation within the household or
expenditure patterns. In so doing our results both show the potential importance of and suggest a new
direction for research on non-unitary models of household behavior.
Our results, based on estimates of the structural model, show that consideration of the process of
household division can enrich our understanding of the effects of technical change on inequality.  In
particular, inattention to the implications of technical change for household division would lead one to
overestimate the extent to which higher levels technical change differentially benefitted better-off
households. Due to the importance of human-capital externalities in production, combined with greater
within-household schooling inequality in richer households, and the presence of decreasing returns to
scale in production, technical change that occurred during the first decade of the green-revolution in
India tended to differentially reduce household division among households with more land resources per
capita. Because of these reductions, the average effect of technical change on income growth for the
members of these resource-rich households was considerably attenuated relative the effects in less
wealthy households at the beginning of the period.42
There are a number of simplifications that have been made in the construction of the model and
its application that reflect the constraints of the data set, practical considerations, and the particular
setting being examined. Some of these simplifications may be relaxed in future research. First, we do not
explicitly model decisions about human capital acquisition, marriage, and fertility that take into account
their potential implications for household break-up. This simplified the analysis by permitting division
probabilities to depend only on current-period observables; allowing fertility and marriage to be
influenced by expectations of household splits would have necessitated the development of a full-scale
dynamic model with forward-looking agents and thus substantially increased the computational burden.
Moreover, these simplifications have some justification in the context of this paper. Levels of education
and the marriage and fertility of the claimants in the data were at least partially resolved before the
differential rates of technical change that resulted from the introduction of new seed varieties in India
became known. The presence of early marriage and high marital fertility also suggest that biological
constraints are likely to be of primary importance in determining variation in these measures. Clearly,
however, if a model is to be used to predict income mobility over several generations in the presence of
sustained levels of technical change it would be necessary to jointly model the processes of educational
acquisition, marriage, fertility, and household division.
Second, reflecting the fact that the data set covers only rural households, the analysis focuses
exclusively on agricultural households. Given low levels of migration and urbanization over the study
period, this does not appear to be a major shortcoming, although again it is clear that a long-run
assessment of the process of income growth in India is likely to require attention to the non-farm sector
in general, and in particular to the process of urbanization. Perhaps a more important limitation of the
analysis is its focus on the division of assets among land owning households, and thus its neglect of  the
poorest sector of the rural population, landless laborers, who make up a quarter of the agricultural
workforce. Analysis of this group would require a detailed model of the labor-market implications of
technical change and is thus left for future research. The basic structure of the model in which43
disagreement over the consumption of the household public good and the role of individual-specific
autarchic incomes, however, would appear relevant for an examination of household division and
mobility in all sectors of the economy.
Third, the static model we employ does not allow for storage possibilities. Our model and the
empirical results suggest, however, that risk sharing considerations are important for understanding the
structure of households. This simplification thus may be important. The literature on savings behavior, on
the other hand, has assumed that the cross-sectional and intertemporal variation in household structure is
exogenous (e.g., Deaton and Paxson, 2000). An important agenda for future research is thus the
theoretical integration of decisions concerning savings and the organization of the household.  
Finally, we have not used the data to examine the potential implications of the model for intra-
household allocation decisions and expenditure patterns, which has been the primary focus of the
existing literature on the non-unitary household.  The model we develop has testable implications, for
example, for the share of the budget spent on private goods such as food and for the extent to which
private goods are allocated towards certain members of the household. Indeed, most previous work on
non-unitary models focuses on intra-household division among married couples given the possibility of
divorce, despite the fact that that option is not often exercised among those who have been married for
some length of time. The fact that household splits are common in this population, not only makes the
basic notion of division as an important factor in household allocation more plausible, but also makes it
much more likely in longitudinal data that one will observe consumption patterns before and after a split
has taken place, thus permitting proper account to be taken of heterogeneity across households that
affects both the distribution of resources and the process of household division.20Equation (24) follows from the assumption that there is no unmeasured heterogeneity in the
marriage hazard underlying equation (23).
21Given patrilocal residence and the early age at marriage for women, the departure of daughters
importantly affects the number and sex composition of the children of heirs in joint households and thus
needs to be accommodated in the model. The departure of sons of the head is captured explicitly by the
model. The sons of other heirs rarely leave the household before the heirs themselves have left and thus,





Simulating Changes in Marriage and Children
The estimated marital status logistic regression for men aged 10-40 in 1982 relating the
probability of ever being married (mstat=1) to age and schooling (ed) was:
with each of these coefficients being significantly different from zero at at least the 1% level. Marital
status for those ever married in 1971 was assumed to remain unchanged over the subsequent 12-year
period. Marriage probabilities for those unmarried in 1971 for each of the next 12 years was computed
using (29) by deriving an expression for the marriage hazard:
where age[x] denotes age in year x and so forth.
20  Given the absence of first marriage after the age of 40
in this population, the marriage hazard was assumed to be zero after that age. These predicated hazards
were then use to stochastically simulate ages at marriage for the never married (in 1971) heirs and heads
in the sample. 
The stock of male and female children of each household claimant for each year in the interval
1971-1982 were constructed by accounting for the observed stock of children in 1971 and estimating
fertility (net of deaths in the first year of life) equations by sex as well as rates of household departure for
daughters.






following multinomial logistic equations predicting the probability of having a surviving son or daughter
that is one year old as a function of the father's age, education, and number of coresident sons and
daughters (boys and girls, respectively) aged two and above :
With the exception of schooling and the number of girls, each of the estimated coefficients was
significantly different from zero at at least the 5% level. Note that fertility has the expected concave
shape in age and that additional sons lead to a significant reduction in subsequent fertility but additional
daughters do not.
Finally, the departures by daughters from the household over the sample period were simulated
by estimating OLS equations relating the numbers of girls living at home and away to husband's
schooling, current age, and age at marriage using the same sample of married women as was used to
estimate the fertility parameters: 
With the exception of schooling, each of the estimated coefficients is different from zero at the 1% level
or greater. The departure probability of girls currently in the household as a function of their father's46
characteristics was computed from these equations as the ratio of the predicted change over consecutive
ages (i.e., age x to x+1) in the number of daughters away from the household divided by the predicted
stock of daughters at home at that father's age.  The resulting departure probability was then applied to
the stock of daughters at home in each year for each claimant to simulate according to a binomial
distribution the number of daughters departing in that year.47
Appendix B
Let qj denote the four-dimensional vector of outcomes for household j and let f(xj,# # # #,ejs) denote
the predicted value of these outcomes from the simulations given the observables xj, the vector of
coefficients # # # #, and the vector of simulation draws ejs for simulation s. The f function was smoothed with
respect to the parameter vector using the logistic transformation. In particular, in the simulation a split
was assumed to take place with probability 1/(exp(Rj/T) when the simulated surplus was computed to be
Rj. This yields consistent estimates as long as T
-1 grows at the same rate as the sample size.
Two simulations per household were then carried out and the criterion function





-6 chosen for the split probability, 1982 landholding, 1971 income, and 1982 income,
respectively. These weights normalize the prediction errors from the four fitted components of the model
so that they are of the same order of magnitude. Minimization of this expression with respect to the
vector # # # # yields dimension(#) moment conditions of the form
which were iteratively solved for # # # #. Standard errors were computed using 75 bootstraps of the sample.
The bootstrap does not account for the fact that the prediction equations for fertility and marriage were
estimated. To do so would be quite complicated as these equations were estimated from the same data set
but quite different samples. Thus the standard errors may be downwardly biased.48
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Table 1
Sample Sizes by 1971 and 1982 Sample Selection Criteria and 1971 Household Status in 1982














(A) + (B) + Head
$40 and Farm
Household (C)
(A) + (B) + (C) +
One or More
Resident Heirs
Head alive, intact Original household No 2114 1942 843 636
Head died, intact Original household No 601 561 425 235
Head alive, split Only part of original
household with head 
Yes 413 351 151 151
Head died, split Not interviewed Yes 1235 1116 365 365
Totals 4363 3970 1784 1387Table 2
Characteristics of Landowning Households in 1971 with Head Aged 40 and Above,
by Potential for Division and Division Status in 1982
Sample
Households with 
at least one heir in 1971
Households with










Percent head died by 1982 70.7 26.9 47.9




































Mean number of departed married






























Percent of heirs ever married 55.8 44.5 -
Percent of households with more than
one heir
66.3 54.3 -
Percent of multi-heir households with
unequal heir schooling
60.7 38.2 -
Number of households 516 871 397
aStandard deviation in parentheses.
bIncludes 1982 intact households and divided households with the original 1971 household head.Table 3
Maximum-Likelihood Probit Estimates: Determinants of the Probability of Household Division Between 1971
and 1982 for Households with at Least One Heir in 1971




































































































Income growth, 1971-82 (x10
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Interactions--Variance of shock (x10
-4)
     x Number of departed
        married daughters.
- --- . 1 8 6
(2.01)
     x Number of claimant wives - - - - .658
(2.37)
Number of departed married daughters - - - - -1.01
(2.06)













2 (df) 31.3 (8) 46.1 (10) 61.8 (14) 91.5 (15) 101.7 (19)
aAbsolute values of asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses.Table 4
Parameter Estimates from the Structural Model
Parameter Coefficient Standard Error
" 1.22 .0417
$:
    1971 Head -1.30 .0755
    Number of boys 2.45 .142
    Number of girls 2.03 .0727
    Married -.223 .114





    0 721.8 8.10
    0N -.341 .0192
    0Nt -.0274 .00292
    0S 25.0 1.73
    0St -10.4 .174
    0NSt .0125 .000184
Scale Effects
    0A -.0377 .00281
    0NAt .00240 .000440
Net Income Variance Effects:
    >3 (A
N) -.0198 .135
    >2 (mstat) -.203 .132
    >1 (Di) 3.99 .343
    >0 0.913 .0860
    >4 (joint residence) 0.594 .0608Table 5
Predicted Effects of Increasing Agricultural Technical Change
on Household Division and Household Public Good Consumption, 
by Per-Capita Land Quartile Group, 1971-82
Quartile: 1 2 3 4
Household division
Actual .0129 .0163 -.1145 -.2190
No intra-household schooling inequality -.0019 .0317 -.0744 -.0852
Public good consumption .0909 .183 .229 .241Table A 


























HYV share*whether maximum schooling
in household is primary or above
- - 8542
(2.72)
Number of farmers 2491 2491 2491
a Instruments include: 1970 assets, gross-cropped area, use of HYV seeds, village adverse weather in
1970-71, and investments in assets between 1968-69 and 1969-70. Mean profits/hectare=955.2.





























Leveraged Residual Plot: Relationship Between Actual Household Fuel Expenditures in 1982















Predicted Effects of Increasing Agricultural Technical Change
on Household Income Growth, by Per-Capita Land Quartile Group, 1971-82